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Abstract
This paper is devoted to analyzing the relationship 
between China banking market structure and performance. 
We employ the methodology of SCP (structure-conduct-
performance), introduce macro economics factors into 
regression model and use the panel data of 14 major 
commercial banks in China Mainland from 2000 to 
2010. The results show that China banking market is 
still in the oligopoly status, and the oligopoly degree 
reduces gradually over time. The oligopoly degree has a 
negative correlation with the performance. The deposit-
loan ratio and the capital adequacy ratio have both 
positive correlations with the performance. We propose 
four advises for reducing the oligopoly degree and 
improving banking industry. They are (1) Reducing great 
banks network externalities barriers; (2) Drawing private 
capital invests into the banking industry; (3) Slackening 
restrictions to foreign banks; (4) Developing the market of 
small-micro enterprises loan.
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INTRODUCTION
The banking industry, as a very important role of the 
financial system, influences a country’s economy 
profoundly. The research showed that increases in the 
market share of small banking institutions enhance 
economic growth in contemporary China (LIN & 
SUN, 2008). In the past years, China banking market 
has experienced a series of great reformations that 
shareholding commercial banks, small-medium banks, 
local commercial banks and credit cooperation had been 
emerging and developing continuously, the statuses of 
big four banks oligopolies1 are shocked by increasing 
competition. Nowadays, there are more than 200 native 
banking institutions all over China and more than 180 
foreign banking branches or offices. However, oligopoly 
status still exists and will persist for long term. This article 
focus on what effects oligopoly market structure has on 
banking performance and what should be done. 
Most of scholars’ studies on banking market structure 
and performance focus on two areas. One is SCP theory 
and another is Efficiency Hypothesis (EH). The study 
supports the EH hypothesis as an explanation for market 
performances in Bangladesh (Abdus Samad, 2008). HE 
(2005) said that the market power hypothesis and the 
efficient structure hypothesis which are used to explain the 
banking performance in foreign countries are of no effect 
in Shanghai banking industry. YUAN (2006) indicated 
that the banking system in China was already near a 
state of perfect competition before foreign banks began 
to enter China’s financial market. On the perspective of 
sharing holding, scholars pointed that a higher ownership 
concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower 
asset risk and lower insolvency risk (Giuliano Iannotta, 
Giacomo Nocera& Andrea Sironi, 2007). Under the 
frame of SCP paradigm, TU and CHEN (2006) indicated 
that the ownership structure and market structure both 
1They are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC) and China 
Construction Bank (CCB).
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have significant effect on state-owned commercial banks 
performance, however, to joint-stock commercial banks, 
the market structure effect more on performance. An 
increase in the degree of market power leads to greater 
bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency (Rima 
Turk Ariss, 2010). XU, SHEN, WANG, and SHEN 
(2009) showed that China’ market structure supports the 
hypothesis of relative market strength. 
The SCP paradigm, as a classical method, is always used 
to study various industries by scholars. Therefore, in this 
article, we also employ SCP to analyze the banking industry 
by using latest data. Especially, the macroeconomics factors 
are included in the regression model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
1 introduces data source and applied variables. Section 2 
shows the empirical analysis process. In section 3, we give 
conclusions and propose recommendations for reducing the 
oligopoly degree and improving banking industry.
1.  DATA AND VARIABLES
1.1  Data Source
To examine the relationship between banking market 
structure and performance, an econometric regression 
model should be established, and then introduce the index 
of market structure into the regression model. Certainly, 
a number of other factors affect the performance even 
the whole regression model will be expounded in the 
following part. Reasonable data are of great importance 
to the regression model. The sampled data are from 14 
major commercial banks in China mainland. They are 
big four state-owned commercial banks and other ten 
joint-stock commercial banks. The big four state-owned 
commercial banks are Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), 
Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank 
(CCB). The other joint-stock commercial banks are Bank 
of Communication (BCM), China CITIC Bank (CITIC), 
China Everbright Bank (CEB), Huaxia Bank (HXB), 
China Minsheng Bank (CMBC), Shenzhen Development 
Bank (SDB), China Merchants Bank (CMB), Industrial 
Bank (CIB), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
(SPDB), and China Guangfa Bank (GDB). 
The samples selected for the time spans from 2000 to 
2010. For this research, authors gathered banking data 
from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking and banks’ 
annual reports. Macroeconomics data are from China 
Statistical Yearbook.
The reasons why the 14 banks selected are they hold 
the most share of China banking market, their branches 
are nearly across China and hold majority of customers. 
Other small-medium and foreign banking institutions 
are not be taken as the result of little business, micro 
market share, weak influences and regional limitation. 
What should be also declared is all of the data are focus 
on RMB business, foreign currency transactions are not 
considered in this paper. 
1.2  Variables 
The variable in this paper used to represent market 
structure is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Moreover, 
CRn, the market concentration rate, is usually utilized to 
represent market structure. But, CRn, an absolute index 
which only represents the top N enterprises scale, can’t 
reflect all enterprises situation of some industry. Therefore, 
we adopt HHI which reflects the enterprises number and 
relative scale synthetically. It is sensitive to the variation 
of top-ranking enterprises’ scale. The equation of HHI is 
showed as equation (1).
2
1
( / )
N
i
HHI Xi X

                         (1)
For this equation, N represents the total number of 
enterprises, Xi represents the scale of enterprise i and X 
represents the total scale of markets, so Xi/X represents 
the market share of enterprise i. In general, the HHI is 
always multiplied by 10000, but in the regression model 
we don’t. Table 1 shows the classification of market 
structure type by using HHI. 
Table 1 
Classification of Market Structure by Using HHI
Type Range of HHI 
Oligopoly type
HHI≥1000
High oligopoly I HHI≥3000
High oligopoly II 3000＞HHI≥1800
Low oligopoly I 1800＞HHI≥1400
Low oligopoly II 1400＞HHI≥1000
Competition type
HHI＜1000
Competition I 1000＞HHI≥500
Competition II 500＞HHI
In regression model, there are two kinds of variables. 
One is explained variable and another is explanatory 
variable. Regression model and variables used in 
this paper are based on methods adopted by existing 
literatures (TU & CHEN, 2006, Abdus Samad, 2008). 
Certainly, there are a few changes in this research. The 
regression model is proposed in section 2. Variables 
and their explanations in this article are listed in Table 
2. We use Return on Stockholders' Equity (ROE) to 
represent banking industrial performance. It is regarded 
as explained variable in the regression model. Moreover, 
the explanatory variables include structure variables and 
controlling variables. Besides the variable of market 
structure HHI, as known that the performance of an 
enterprise is related to its scale, so Market Share (MS) is 
employed as another structure variable in the regression 
model to represent banks’ market power. We also employ 
a number of other controlling variables. They are deposit-
loan ratio (RATE), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), per 
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capita GDP growth (PCG) and portion of tertiary industry 
output in GDP (INS).
Deposit-loan ratio (RATE) and Capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) are used as explanatory variables, because 
the banking performance is relevant to the managing 
ability, RATE reflects the profit ability and CAR reflects 
the ability of resisting risk. Both of them reflect the bank 
managing ability. Banking industry is an intermediary for 
regulating macro economy, macro economy development 
drives all social industries performance and banking 
performance is certain influenced by its operation 
profoundly. It is necessary to consider macroeconomics 
variables introducing into the regression model. So, 
the per capita GDP growth (PCG) is employed in the 
model. Economic policy always influences an industry 
development. Banking sectors, as the key component in 
tertiary industry, are easily impacted by industry policy. 
So, we use the portion of tertiary industry output in GDP 
(INS) as a variable to reflect the impact of industry policy 
and structure transferring in the regression model.
Table 2
Explanations of Variables in This Paper
Performance Variable ROE(Return on Stockholders' Equity)
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2.   EMPIRICAL AND REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 
2.1  Empirical Analysis on Banking Market 
Structure
We worked out the HHI of China banking market structure 
by using equation (1) and the results are presented in 
Table 3.
Table 3 
HHI of China Banking Market Structure: 2000-2010
HHI Total of Assets Balance of Deposits Balance of Loans
2000 0.1979 0.2238 0.2267
2001 0.1863 0.2038 0.2147
2002 0.1794 0.1878 0.1910
2003 0.1975 0.2103 0.1782
2004 0.1614 0.1671 0.1683
2005 0.1616 0.1656 0.1555
2006 0.1587 0.1493 0.1496
2007 0.1513 0.1562 0.1422
2008 0.1451 0.1559 0.1386
2009 0.1428 0.1489 0.1364
2010 0.1376 0.1436 0.1337
Statement: The results are figured out based on Almanac of 
China’s Finance and Banking and Banks’ Annual Reports.
Comparing and analyzing Table 1 and Table 3, then 
list the analysis results in Table 4. According to Table 1 
and Table 3, we get that China banking market structure 
is oligopoly type, and China’s banking market sustained 
oligopoly situation for the past long time. In Table 3, 
the statistic data tell us that the decline presents a gentle 
trend. In Table 4, it could be observed that total of assets 
declines 30.47%, balance of deposits declines 35.84%, 
especially, the balance of loans decline 41.02%. So, it 
can be concluded that the oligopoly degree of the market 
appeared a marked decline during the period of eleven 
years. Above all, we come three conclusions that China 
banking market is oligopoly structure, the oligopoly 
degree is declining and the declining trend is gentle.
Table 4 
Data Analysis Results of HHI
HHI Max (Time)
Min 
(Time) Average Decline
Total of Assets 0.1979(2000)
0.1376
(2010) 0.1654 30.47%
Balance of Deposits 0.2238(2000)
0.1436
(2010) 0.1738 35.84%
Balance of Loans 0.2267(2000)
0.1337
(2010) 0.1668 41.02%
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Based on the above analysis data, we explore and 
summarize the causes. The oligopoly is original from 
early planned economy period. Before 1980s, China 
banking market was single-bank status. People’s Bank 
of China played the role of not only central bank but 
also commercial bank. The big four banks separated 
successively first, joint-stock commercial banks came 
soon afterwards. Because of late emerging of joint-stock 
commercial banks and the public dependence to the big 
four banks which are supported by national credit, the 
barriers of network externality blocked the small-medium 
banks’ entrance and development. So the banking market 
structure was oligopoly in the past long term. However, 
as a result of a series of national financial reformations, 
local governments’ supporting to small-medium banks 
and the open for foreign banking sectors entrance, the 
oligopoly degree, especially the degree of balance of loans 
is declining obviously. The reason why the decline trend 
is gentle is that no matter financial reformations or small-
medium banks rising or foreign banking sectors entrance, 
all of the above are implemented stepwise. It also 
indicates that there is no severe shocking during banking 
market developing. 
Table 5
14 Banks’ Market Share
Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ICBC 0.2997 0.2868 0.2832 0.3156 0.2295 0.2472 0.2445 0.2375 0.2326 0.2232 0.2170
ABC 0.1648 0.1755 0.1780 0.2104 0.1827 0.1799 0.1746 0.1655 0.1672 0.1682 0.1667
BOC 0.2025 0.1802 0.1707 0.0189 0.1944 0.1789 0.1736 0.1640 0.1448 0.1472 0.1469
CCB 0.1910 0.1919 0.1844 0.2141 0.1780 0.1729 0.1774 0.1804 0.1801 0.1823 0.1743
CR4 0.8580 0.8344 0.8163 0.7590 0.7846 0.7789 0.7701 0.7474 0.7247 0.7209 0.7049
BCM 0.0474 0.0464 0.0459 0.0572 0.0518 0.0537 0.0559 0.0575 0.0637 0.0614 0.0636
CITIC 0.0177 0.0208 0.0200 0.0253 0.0230 0.0231 0.0230 0.0277 0.0315 0.0336 0.0336
CEB 0.0154 0.0184 0.0191 0.0238 0.0190 0.0194 0.0194 0.0202 0.0203 0.0227 0.0239
HXB 0.0072 0.0095 0.0107 0.0149 0.0139 0.0134 0.0145 0.0162 0.0174 0.0160 0.0168
CMBC 0.0053 0.0096 0.0146 0.0217 0.0203 0.0210 0.0236 0.0252 0.0250 0.0266 0.0287
SDB 0.0050 0.0083 0.0099 0.0116 0.0093 0.0086 0.0085 0.0096 0.0113 0.0111 0.0117
CMB 0.0166 0.0185 0.0222 0.0303 0.0267 0.0277 0.0304 0.0358 0.0375 0.0392 0.0387
CIB 0.0065 0.0087 0.0114 0.0157 0.0155 0.0179 0.0201 0.0233 0.0243 0.0252 0.0297
SPDB 0.0098 0.0121 0.0167 0.0223 0.0207 0.0216 0.0224 0.0251 0.0312 0.0307 0.0353
GDB 0.0112 0.0133 0.0131 0.0182 0.0154 0.0146 0.0122 0.0120 0.0130 0.0126 0.0131
Max 0.2997 0.2868 0.2832 0.3156 0.2295 0.2472 0.2445 0.2375 0.2326 0.2232 0.2170
Min 0.0050 0.0083 0.0099 0.0116 0.0093 0.0086 0.0085 0.0096 0.0113 0.0111 0.0117
Max of All: 0.3156 Min of All: 0.0050
Statement: We figured out their market shares according to the total assets results based on data from Almanac of China’s Finance and 
Banking and Banks’ Annual Reports.)
Table 5 shows the sampled 14 commercial banks’ 
respective market shares annually. Moreover, the big four 
banks’ total market shares are listed in the line of CR4. The 
value of CR4 steady declines annually. This demonstrates 
the conclusions which obtained when analyzing HHI. It 
can be observed that the max of all is 0.3156, the min of 
all is 0.0050. Except for the big four banks, by contrast, 
each of the other ten just holds a bitsy portion of the 
whole market. The big four banks’ significant outstanding 
values mean they take the most share of China banking 
market. Observing all banks’ market shares listed in 
Table 5, especially the values of Max and Min, there is 
a sharp difference between big four and other ten about 
market share, which tells us that the banking market is 
an unreasonable situation. Though many implemented 
measures in the past, but the big four still hold above 
70% of the whole market. A more perfect and efficient 
competitive environment is urgently needed for China 
banking industry. This indicates more effective and 
stronger measures for banking industry reformation. 
2.2 Regression Analysis on Market Structure and 
Performance
According to SCP analyzing paradigm, the market 
structure affects performance. So we analyze this 
relationship in this section. A panel data regression model 
using the identified variables in section 1 is presented as 
equation (2).
0 1 2 3it it it it itROE HHI MS Xβ β β β µ= + + + +   (2)
For equation (2), 0β is constant, itµ is random error, 
i represents individuality and t represents year. Return 
on Stockholders’ Equity (ROE) is explained variable. 
Because HHI can reflect the comprehensive condition of 
the whole banking industry and MS is used to reflect bank 
individual’s market power, HHI and MS are regarded as 
the index of market structure. The X which stands for 
other controlling variables includes RATE, CAR, PCG 
and INS. We introduced the above variables into the 
regression model and processed the regression analysis 
by using Eviews6.0. The Hausman-test indicated random-
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effect model should be utilized. Because balance of loan 
can reflects a bank’s marketing and managing ability 
better than other index, balance of loan HHI is used in the 
regression model. The regression results are listed in Table 6.
Table 6
Results of Regression
Structure Variables Controlling Variables
Variables HHI MS RATE CAR PCG INS
Coefficient Estimations -0.081589 -0.003167 0.003919 0.013898 0.006253 0.052273
T-Values -5.019877 -0.674096 3.765672 3.721424 1.200093 2.220252
Significance (1%) yes yes yes
F-statistic: 39.52215 R2: 0.617320 Adj-R2: 0.601700
We concern the relationship between performance and 
variables, especially the HHI. In Table 6, the negative 
sign symbol of HHI indicates that the oligopoly degree is 
negative correlation to banking performance. The capital 
adequacy ratio, which reflects the ability of resisting risk, 
the sign symbol of CAR is positive and the regression 
result is significant, so the CAR is positive correlation to 
bank performance. 
The regression results show coefficient estimations 
of MS, PCG and INS are no significant. So, we get that 
the three variables above have no significant effect on 
the banking performance in this paper. However, because 
the sign symbol of MS is negative, it can be inferred that 
the market share expansion leads to the performance 
lowering. Similarly, the sign symbols of PCG &INS are 
positive, so we deem that the healthy macro economy 
arouse good banking performance. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that banking performance is positive correlation 
to macro economic variables (PCG &INS).
RATE’s coefficient is positive and the result is 
significant. In this article, RATE is deposit-loan ratio. 
Banks pay interest when absorbing deposits and charging 
when loaning, generally, the deposit-loan ratio lower, 
the interest income higher. But in this paper, the results 
show the deposit-loan ratio is positive correlation to 
performance. It seems dissimilar with common sense. But 
what should be pointed is that although the regression 
result of RATE is significant, but it is just 0.003919. It 
shows that the RATE’s effecting is rather low compared 
with the other variables. Additionally, because of fierce 
competition, banks scrambling for deposits to meet the 
regulator’s requirement of a minimum loan-to-deposit 
ratio, and impacts from the international financial crisis, 
enterprises weren’t willing to loan. So we believe the 
results the regression result of RATE emerged are robust.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1)  Conclusions
According to the empirical analysis based on statistics 
data, we come three conclusions that China banking 
market is oligopoly structure, the oligopoly degree is 
declining and the declining trend is gentle.
According to the regression results, we conclude 
that high degree oligopoly leads to low performance, 
the oligopoly degree has a negative correlation with the 
performance, and the deposit-loan ratio and the capital 
adequacy ratio have both positive correlations with the 
performance. Market share, per capita GDP growth 
and portion of tertiary industry growth in GDP have no 
significant influence on banking performance.
Therefore, we deem that it is helpful for improving 
banking market structure and performance that promoting 
the breaking oligopoly and managing ability reformation. 
(2)  Recommendations
At present, the big four banks are still holding the 
most share of market. The oligopoly status has been 
longstanding and will last for long term, but emerging 
of various financial institutions is shocking the banking 
oligarchs. The structure reformation dynamic mainly 
originates in the rising of small-medium banks. It cannot 
solve the problem of monopoly radically. Because capital 
adequacy ratio is positive correlation to performance, an 
effective method to improving performance is increasing 
capital adequacy ratio. The approach of increasing capital 
adequacy ratio is extending capital. At present, due to 
restrictions, private capital invested into banking industry 
is not abundant. Banking individual structure reformation 
is of great importance also. Banking performance 
would be improved, the custom and investment would 
be stimulated if banking sectors loan to privates and 
enterprises actively. Perfect and efficient competitive 
environment induces healthy industry development. So, 
we present the following recommendations. 
1) Reducing Great Banks Network Externalities 
Barriers
Big state-owned commercial banks have more coverage, 
branches and customer groups. The public are unwilling 
to be customer of small financial institutions. To break 
the network externalities barriers, transaction platform 
construction and improvement are necessary. An effective 
method to realize the sharing and floating of transaction 
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information is to interconnect various transaction 
platforms like China Union Pay, Rural Credit Banks 
Funds Clearing Center and Clearing Center for City 
Commercial Banks. Another key is reducing cross regions 
banking business and customer of cross banks transaction 
fees, even to some small-medium banking institutions, 
eliminating fees is necessary. Like that, small-medium 
banking institutions could hold fixed customers and the 
network externalities barriers could be lessened. 
2) Drawing Private Capital Invests into Banking Industry
Private capital should be invested into establish banks 
and expend the shareholder span of commercial banks. 
We deem that absorbing private capital is an effective 
approach for extending capital scale. It’s not only helpful 
for improving capital adequacy ratio but also helpful for 
reducing monopoly degree. Multi-polarization of banking 
market implies more logical competition environment. 
Meanwhile, it could also share the speculation risk. 
3) Slackening Restrictions to Foreign Banks
Although foreign banks have entered China for many 
years, but their scale is still limited. For instance, Citibank 
has below 100 branches in China by the end of 2011. 
Considering the shock to domestic banking from foreign 
banks, many restrictions were implemented in China. 
Most foreign banking branches concentrate in economic 
developed east coastal urban, but few inland. Restrictions 
for foreign banks in China should be slackened along with 
inland economic developing. It’s an effective approach 
for achieving complete competition and helpful for native 
banks to learn advanced experience that eliminating 
differential treatment between domestic and foreign. Old 
management patterns leads to path dependence, foreign 
banks can bring new competition mechanism for domestic 
banking market. New competition mechanism drives 
banks reform and new competitors’ entrance will reduce 
market concentration ratio.
4) Developing Market of Small-Micro Enterprises 
Loan
Small-micro enterprises with limited credits always face 
problem of loan difficult. There exists capacious market 
space of small-micro enterprises loan. For instance, in 
Shaanxi Province, the balance of loan to small-micro 
enterprises reached 235.678 billion yuan by the end 
of 2011 (GUO, 2012). This indicates large capacity of 
small-micro enterprises loan market. While loaning to 
small-micro enterprises is not the focus of great banks. 
So, small-medium banks ought to develop in this field. 
Small-micro enterprises are urgent for some innovation 
finance service like small loan and microfinance products. 
Products diversification and differences of competition 
are efficient ways for small-medium banks to share the 
market. It is beneficial for small-medium banks competing 
with big banks and breaking oligopoly status. 
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